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Abstract: For several months now, a dispute has been
raging in the literature and the media on the so-called
Target2 balances. Ostensibly, the debate concerns the
eurozone settlement system. According to Hans-Werner
Sinn, who initiated the debate, the balances that have
accumulated in this system resemble billion-euro rescue
packages which no parliament drew up or ratified.
Triggered by Garber’s (1999 and 2010) and Sinn’s
(2011) contributions, a debate has arisen over the
eurozone settlement system, called Target2, during
the last few months. Important parts of this discus-
sion can be found in a recent paper by Sinn and
Wollmershäuser (2011), which this paper refers to.
The present article elaborates some central points of
disagreement and assesses them. The focus of the
analysis will be on the settlement system’s economic
effects. In order to illustrate them as clearly as possi-
ble, technical details will be neglected, as will political
or normative questions. 
What is Target2?
The acronym Target stands for ‘Trans-European
Automated Real-time Gross Settlement Express
Transfer’. Target2 represents the second generation
of this eurozone settlement system, controlled by the
ECB, in which central banks as well as private insti-
tutions participate. Because Target2 was designed as
a pure settlement system, the balances of all partici-
pants equal zero at any point in time. No ceilings for
credits or overdrafts were fixed with respect to the
individual Target2 balances, as it was assumed that
only insignificant settlement differences would
remain in the accounts. This assumption has proven
to be false: as from 2007 on, national central banks’
balances, which do not show up in the consolidated
balance sheet of the Eurosystem but are to be
derived from the national central banks’ balance
sheets, have in some cases climbed to astronomical
amounts. At the end of 2010, the Target2 account of
the Deutsche Bundesbank as the major creditor
amounted to 326 billion euros, whereas the accounts
of the major debtors, i.e. the central banks of
Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, showed a total
debit of 340 billion euros (Deutsche Bundesbank
2011). The balances of the central banks of the re  -
maining euro countries were smaller, with Luxem  -
bourg, at 68 billion euros, being the next biggest
creditor and France, at 29 billion euros, the next
biggest debtor. The per capita credit of Germany
amounts to 4,000 euros and that of Luxembourg to
more than 125,000 euros.1
What is the economic meaning of Target2 balances?
Due to the complexity of monetary policy instru-
ments, which easily hide economic relationships, we
would like to start the analysis of Target2 balances
with a very simplified model that comprises two eco-
nomic agents A and B and a bank. In the base case, A
supplied B with merchandise worth 10,000 euros on
account. There are no other transactions, and there
are no other agents besides A and B and the bank.
Disturbing details like transaction costs or an equity
base of the bank are ignored. 
Balances of payments are usually only drawn up for
countries but the concept can just as well refer to in  -
dividuals: by supplying merchandise, agent A
achieves a balance of payments surplus of 10,000 eu  -
ros as he has exported this amount without import-
ing anything. As a mirror image, A’s net claims
increase by 10,000 euros, which is counted as capital
export. Conversely, B’s current account shows a
deficit of 10,000 euros, combined with a capital
import of the same size. 
* Director, Institute of Public Finance, Leibniz University of
Hannover. The article was also published in Wirtschaftsdienst 91(8),
526–530.
1 The Target2 balance may be accessed online at www.bundes-
bank.de/statistik as time series EU8148, the entire external position
of the Deutsche Bundesbank in the eurozone as time series EU8141.
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After B, in a second step, has transferred the amount
of the invoice – the broken line in Figure 1 – he owes
the bank this very amount, while A’s bank account
shows a corresponding credit. These legal debt rela-
tionships are represented by solid arrows pointing in
the direction of the debtor. The money transfer does
not change the net claim positions of A or B, and the
bank still has a net claim position of zero.
Two things ought to be noted here. First, A has sup-
plied the merchandise and saved the amount earned
because at a later date – perhaps in old age – he hopes
to get a corresponding return shipment or a service. If
B dies or withdraws for other reasons, A’s calculation
does not work out, as the bank has no assets left and
cannot repay the credit. For A, it is of the utmost
importance that the bank only grants B the loan
against sufficient collateral. 
Second, for each economic agent it is true that the
current account (CA) and the capital account (KA)
equal zero:
CA + KA = 0.
A current account surplus is always and inevitably
accompanied by a capital account deficit, i.e. a net
capital export. This fact is not amenable to an empir-
ical test or economic reasoning but is a conceptual
identity. For each economic agent, current account
and capital account balances always add up to zero.
The same is true for any group of economic agents,
like the inhabitants of a country. Hence we can add as
many agents as we want to the above model without
changing this central aspect. 
In the next step we assume – all other model assump-
tion remaining valid – that A and B live in different
eurozone countries. In addition, the model is extend-
ed to include another commercial bank, two national
central banks and the ECB.2 The dashed line in
Figure 2 again shows the money flow, while the solid
arrows represent the resulting claims and liabilities
and point in the direction of the debtor.
Subsequent to the required rebooking, A and B are
in the same positions as in the base case, and all par-
ticipating commercial and central banks have net
assets of zero. In the Target2 system, the account of
the A-central bank has a credit of 10,000 euros and
the account of the B-central bank a corresponding
debit. For lack of other agents, the balance of pay-
ments statistics show a surplus for country A and a
corresponding deficit for country B. In another
important respect, too, nothing changes compared
to the base case: if B drops out as debtor, the money
assets of A and his hopes for a later return transfer
vanish in thin air. 
The Target2 balances disappear when B sells A mer-
chandise worth 10,000 euros. In this way the current
account and capital account balances are adjusted;
both individuals have exported and imported for
10,000 euros. In a parallel fashion, Target2 balances
disappear when B issues a bond worth 10,000 euros
that A buys: consequently, country B’s current
account deficit remains in existence but is financed by
a private, market-based capital import. In Figure 2,
the purchase of the bond by A would trigger a money
flow in the opposite direction that cancels all the
claims between banks, central banks and the ECB. 
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Figure 1
Processing a simple transfer
Source: Author’s conception.
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Figure 2
Processing a transfer in the Target2 system
Source: Author’s conception.
2 The intermediary position of the two central banks is superfluous
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To sum up, country B’s current account deficit can
either be financed by private capital imports or via
Target2. In the first case, private agents hold a claim
against country B; in the second the claim against
country B is held by the ECB. In order to distinguish
sharply between central bank and private claims,
respectively, it seems useful to define the Target2 bal-
ance as follows: 
KA = KA* + T.
For every eurozone country, the capital account in
the wider sense (KA) consists of the capital account
in the narrower sense (KA*), which is implicitly
defined by this equation, and changes in the coun-
try’s Target2 balance. T > 0 represents a payment
inflow into the country, which is accompanied by an
overdraft of the Target2 account. The capital
account in the narrower sense may comprise also
public capital movements other than those of the
Target2 system; but these will be ignored in the fol-
lowing. The definition above is reminiscent of the
differentiation – often used with the gold standard
and the Bretton Woods System – between a capital
account in the narrower sense and a foreign
exchange account. Indeed, there is an analogy
between Target2 balances and foreign exchange
movements in a fixed exchange rates regime, the
important difference being that foreign exchange
reserves are finite whereas Target2 accounts may be
overdrawn infinitely. Substituting the above defini-
tion into the equation of the balance of payments
results in: 
CA + KA* + T = 0.
This equation leads to the economic core of the
problem, namely, a statement that is true for purely
logical reasons: without Target2, i.e. when T vanish-
es, current account deficits (CA < 0) must be
financed by private capital imports (KA* > 0). If the
market refuses to grant a country further credit, the
country concerned cannot maintain a current
account deficit but is only able to import as much as
it exports. In contrast to this, Target2 enables a
country to finance current account deficits even after
complete credit rationing (KA* = 0) by overdrawing
its central bank account, T > 0. Sinn has shown
empirically that this scenario fits the cases of Greece
and Portugal. After the outbreak of the crisis, both
countries were no longer able to finance their current
account deficits via private capital imports as credi-
tors had become cautious. Instead, the import sur-
pluses were (and still are) financed via Target2. How
long this process can go on is unclear, but neither
price signals nor foreign exchange reserve scarcities
will stop it.3
Target2 not only permits a basically unlimited
financing of current account deficits but also the
financing of capital flight (KA* < 0) with a bal-
anced current account (CA = 0). This scenario fits
Spain and even more so Ireland.4 In both cases pri-
vate creditors have vanished and the ECB took their
place. Economically this represents a stealthy
bailout of yet unknown volume. Since the addition
of the three variables CA, KA and T always equals
zero, hypotheses about whether changes in T stem
from changes in the current account or changes in
the capital account, respectively, are not airtight. Yet
the basic argument that Target2 debts are always
caused by current account deficits or capital account
deficits or a combination of the two remains unaf-
fected. This point was illustrated above using two
extreme cases.
In conclusion, Target2 balances reflect real econom-
ic claims or liabilities. A Target2 credit represents a
net claim position of the respective country behind
which are claims of private savers. Conversely, a
Target2 liability presents corresponding debts of the
respective country, be they public or household or
corporate debts. In contrast to net claim positions
due to private transactions, credits and debits in the
Target2 system are not economically kosher, as they
are not based on market signals and hard creditwor-
thiness tests but on the Eurosystem’s malpractice to
accept all financial instruments whose rating is
above D. It is quite simple indeed: if private investors
react elastically to risks whereas the Eurosystem
reacts inelastically, re-allocations will take place with
all bad risks ending up in the books of the central
banks. This is exactly what has happened during the
last years.
What is the risk for Germany? 
As described in the beginning, the Target2 credit of
the Deutsche Bundesbank amounted to about
326 billion euros at the end of last year whereas
Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain together had a
3 If Target2 balances grow without limit, the Bundesbank could in
the end become a debtor to the domestic commercial banks (Abad,
Loeffler and Zemanek 2011). This is abnormal but not impossible. 
4 Buiter, Rahbari and Michel (2011) as well as Bindseil and König
(2011) have reached similar conclusions. Their nitpicking criticism of
Sinn is hardly comprehensible as Sinn emphasized the importance of
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debit of 340 billion euros. What risk the balances
imply for Germany depends on the scenario drawn.
Let us first look at Greece’s return to the drachma.
If Greece is not able or willing to cancel the remain-
ing euro balance on its Target2 account, the ECB
will suffer a corresponding loss. This loss has to be
borne by the national central banks of the remain-
ing euro countries according to their capital share,
with Germany accounting for 27 percent. Depend  -
ing on the size of the amount, the Deutsche Bun  -
desbank must be recapitalised by the taxpayer,
thereby bringing the loss to light. The fact that
Germany bears ‘only’ 27 percent of the losses is con-
sidered comforting by some. However, this ratio is
endogenous and rises depending on how many euro
countries leave the eurozone, up to 100 percent in
the worst case scenario.
It would be different if Germany were to leave the
eurozone, not the other countries. In this case the lia-
bilities of the problem countries would not matter, but
Germany’s credit, as those left behind would hardly
be willing to pay out the German Target2 credit in
gold or similar assets and at the same time assume the
full risk vis-à-vis the problem states. At the end of
2010, Germany’s stake amounted to the full 326 bil-
lion euros. 
Secondary issues
There will be few objections to the above remarks, as
they reflect simple textbook knowledge. The current
debate does not focus on the core aspects but on sec-
ondary issues. Let us select two of them to extend our
argument. First, the above considerations imply in no
way that German exports to Greece are financed by
Target2. This may occur accidentally but it is neither
necessary nor of importance, as it is not the bilateral
balances of payments that count but the correspond-
ing total balances of payments. The economic effect is
independent of whether Germany exports to Greece
or Germany to China, China to Singapore and
Singapore to Greece. 
Second, the Target2 system does not in any way limit
the German potential to supply credit to its economy
– even if we were to assume a constant central bank
money supply in the eurozone. To show this and
delve into the mechanics of the balances in greater
depth, let us look at a Greek asset owner who has a
deposit of 1 million euros with his Greek bank. The
bank is assumed to have used this deposit to acquire
Greek government bonds. If the asset owner closes
his savings account and transfers his money to a
newly opened account in Germany, then central
bank money flows out of Greece and into Germany.
These outflows and inflows are then neutralised via
Target2, with the Greek bank refinancing itself by
pledging its government bonds at the Greek central
bank, whereas the German bank reduces its refi-
nancing at the Deutsche Bundesbank. Subsequent to
the neutralisation, the money supply of the national
central bank is as large as before the capital flight
took place. There is no change in the potential cred-
it supply of German banks. The German banks refi-
nance simply by relying more on deposits and less on
central bank credit. To be sure, the risk moves from
the Greek asset owner to the German taxpayer. And
what is more, the continuing flow of funds to the
periphery countries made possible by Target2 only
diminish Germany’s potential to use these funds
domestically. 
Target2, Eurobonds and the ESM
Last year, the eurozone member states discussed
extensively the introduction of so-called Eurobonds,
i.e. about securities for which they are liable in pro-
portion to their ECB shares (in another proposal,
the states would even bear joint liability). Because of
the opposition primarily in Germany to such a lia-
bility union, the plan was discarded. It is interesting,
however, that Target2 balances are economically
equivalent to Eurobonds, as all member states are
liable for the debts in the Target2 system according
to their ECB shares. This aspect is extraordinarily
important and at the same time disquieting because
the elected representatives rejected exactly those
Eurobonds that in fact already existed behind the
scenes. 
The same can be said for the ESM. This mechanism
which is permanently coping with the crisis is also
equivalent to Eurobonds. As a special purpose vehi-
cle, the ESM grants loans to problem countries, for
which all members of the eurozone are liable in pro-
portion to their ECB shares. The formal establish-
ment of the ESM is to be voted on soon; de facto it
has already existed for years. 
Only the recognition of the equivalence of Target2,
Eurobonds and ESM allows us to interpret the con-
flict between the governments of the eurozone on the
one hand and the ECB on the other: the ECB sup-
ports establishing a special purpose vehicle because it
secretly hopes to shift its Target2 problem to theCESifo Forum 2012 54
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ESM; it does not want to be saddled with these debts.
Its hopes will not be fulfilled, however, as the govern-
ments for their part are not interested in taking
Target2 debts into their remit and make them appar-
ent to taxpayers. European governments prefer to cre-
ate, with the ESM, a liability union in addition to
Target2 in order to promote what they consider their
most important right, i.e. the right to accumulate pub-
lic debts without restraint.
Possible solutions?
The aberrations outlined above could have been
avoided if it had been stipulated that Target2 bal-
ances be adjusted periodically or at least fully col-
lateralised. This was omitted, however, consciously
or unconsciously. After the fact there is not much
that can be done. Adjustments in the balances of
payments would require the problem countries to
build up current account surpluses or capital
imports in a three-digit billion euro range, which is
unrealistic. It is equally unrealistic to demand from
the ECB to return to sound collateral practices. For,
what collateral could Greek or Irish banks and cen-
tral banks offer? Only those that they themselves
have accepted, i.e. securities with ratings close to D.
The fact that the Eurosystem is accepting junk
bonds as collateral is not only an eminent fault of
monetary policy which has deeply corrupted the
ECB’s reputation but is also at the heart of the
Target2 problem: balances of this magnitude would
not have accumulated if the ECB had only accepted
traditional collateral. 
In the same way that our agent A has no recourse to
his claim if B drops out as debtor, many German
savers and pensioners will learn that parts of their
assets are imaginary. In this respect, the build-up of
fictitious deposits in the Target2 system is reminiscent
of Germany’s stealthy military financing in the 1930s
and during World War II, the famous geräuschlose
Kriegsfinanzierung.
Conclusion
Hans-Werner Sinn’s allusion to the dangers that are
brewing in the Target2 system is fully warranted.
Economically, Target2 balances are equivalent to
Eurobonds and are also equivalent to the ESM. By
accepting junk bonds as collateral, the Eurosystem
anticipated the establishment of the ESM, created a
gigantic liability union, and violated the principle of
good central bank policy, according to which mone-
tary policy should not have redistributive effects and
is to be sharply separated from fiscal policy. The fact
that the ECB’s Chief Economist thinks, with a view
to Sinn’s theses, that several academics are risking
their reputation,5 is not only absurd in content but is
once again reminiscent of war, in which truth is the
first to die.
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